Taxing behavioral control diminishes sharing and costly punishment in childhood by Steinbeis, N
Behavioral control and altruism in childhood 
 
 1 
 
Taxing behavioral control diminishes sharing and costly punishment in 
childhood 
 
Steinbeis, Nikolaus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology 
University of Leiden 
Wassenaarseweg 54  
2333 AK Leiden 
Netherlands 
Word Count: 5436 
Running Head: Behavioral control and altruism in childhood 
  
Behavioral control and altruism in childhood 
 
 2 
Research Highlights:  
 Taxing behavioral control reduces subsequent sharing and costly 
punishment but leaves fairness perception and emotions unchanged 
 Taxing emotion regulation increases subsequent anger in response to 
unfair offers but does not influence decisions to punish 
 Behavioral control specifically plays a key role in altruistic behavior in 
children 
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Instances of altruism in children are well documented. However, the underlying 
mechanisms of such altruistic behavior are still under considerable debate. 
While some claim that altruistic acts occur automatically and spontaneously, 
others argue that they require behavioral control. This study focuses on the 
mechanisms that give rise to prosocial decisions such as sharing and costly 
punishment. In two studies it is shown in 124 children aged 6-9 years that 
behavioral control plays a critical role for both prosocial decisions and costly 
punishment. Specifically, the studies assess the influence of taxing aspects of self-
regulation, such as behavioral control (Study 1) and emotion regulation (Study 
2) on subsequent decisions in a Dictator and an Ultimatum Game. Further, 
children’s perception of fairness norms and emotional experience were 
measured. Taxing children’s behavioral control prior to making their decisions 
reduced sharing and costly punishment of unfair offers, without changing 
perception of fairness norms or the emotional experience. Conversely, taxing 
children’s emotion regulation prior to making their decisions only led to 
increased experience of anger at seeing unfair offers, but left sharing, costly 
punishment and the perception of fairness norms unchanged. These findings 
stress the critical role of behavioral control in prosocial giving and costly 
punishment in childhood.  
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Introduction 
Why humans invest time, money and effort in others without the chance of 
repeated encounters and low reputation gains remains an evolutionary puzzle. 
Such altruism, defined as behaviors which incur a personal cost to benefit 
another in some way (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), already occurs early in 
development (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006).  In children altruistic behaviors 
are manifold and include deciding to help (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), to 
comfort (Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010) and to share (Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011). While prior research has focused on describing these 
phenomena across development (Paulus, 2014), less is known about their 
underlying processes. Particularly, the psychological mechanisms of altruistic 
decisions like sharing remain elusive, especially in middle childhood. The 
present study is on the underlying mechanisms of altruistic decisions in children 
aged 6-9 year and addresses the question if sharing and costly punishment 
require effortful self-regulation The development of altruistic behavior is critical 
for creating and sustaining personal relationships as well as for maintaining a 
functioning society. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of altruistic 
behavior can help support and encourage its development. 
 
Altruistic behavior entails incurring a cost. As a result the study of altruistic 
decisions has been dominated by a debate of two prevailing and competing 
explanations. Some claim that altruistic decisions in adults occur automatically, 
intuitively and effortlessly (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Zaki & Mitchell, 
2013), while others argue that this requires effort and self-restraint, without 
which behavior would be exclusively selfish (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, 
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Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; Rachlin, 2002). While there is direct evidence in support of 
both views, findings from developmental psychology have also been invoked to 
arbitrate between the two perspectives, under the assumption that the 
developmental origins of altruistic mechanisms can shed light on their operation 
later in life (Rand et al., 2012; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013).  
 
Developmental studies have shown that infants begin to share around 15-
months (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011) and that infants, toddlers and even 5-
year olds seem to find sharing candies inherently rewarding (Aknin, Broesch, 
Hamlin, & Van de Vondervoort, 2015; Aknin, Hamlin, & Dunn, 2012). In 
combination with other forms of early altruistic behavior such as helping 
without incentives in 18 month olds (Tomasello, 2012; Warneken, Hare, Melis, 
Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) there appears to be 
strong evidence that initial forms of altruistic behavior are indiscriminate, 
automatic and spontaneous.  
 
Around 3 years, children begin to be more selective in their altruistic behavior 
however, for instance helping only those that had previously been nice rather 
than harmful (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). From 5 years of age 
children are more generous when observed by peers than when alone 
(Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012; Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos, & Olson, 
2012) and they also begin to discriminate in their decisions to share based on 
arbitrarily assigned group membership (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011). These 
findings show that altruistic decisions become increasingly more selective and 
less automatic possibly as a result of regulatory processes that mediate the 
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decisions depending on contextual variables. While the mechanisms of altruistic 
decisions such as sharing and helping have been extensively investigated in 
children 5 years and younger (for a recent review see Martin & Olson, 2015), 
much less is known about altruistic decisions and their mechanisms in children 
during middle childhood. Extending the studied age range is especially important 
however because mechanisms underlying altruism early in development do not 
necessarily correlate with those later in development (Paulus et al., 2015). The 
present study sheds light on the mechanisms of altruistic decisions namely 
sharing and costly punishment in children aged 6-9 years.  
 
While in preschoolers there is some initial evidence of a link between self-
regulatory processes such as inhibitory control and decisions to share (Aguilar-
Pardo, Martinez-Arias, & Colmenares, 2013; Paulus et al., 2015), this is much less 
clear in middle childhood. Because altruistic decisions become more selective 
and subject to contextual variables by middle childhood, it was hypothesized 
that self-regulation abilities would play a prominent role during this 
developmental period. So far, some studies have shown a positive correlation 
between sharing and inhibitory control (Blake, Piovesan, Montinari, Warneken, 
& Gino, 2015) while others have not (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). Given the 
purely correlative nature of the current evidence its validity has been questioned 
more generally (Buckholtz, 2015; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013).  
 
To generate more reliable evidence of a mechanistic relationship between 
effortful self-regulation and altruism in childhood the present study employed a 
well-established procedure typically used to uncover whether self-regulation 
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plays a role in specific behaviors. Thus, it has been shown that having to regulate 
oneself in some form (i.e. inhibiting prepotent or overlearned responses; 
regulating emotions; diverting attention from distractors) can have deleterious 
effects on subsequent tasks requiring the same mental operations (Hagger, 
Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). 
This procedure lends itself to testing whether altruistic behavior in childhood 
requires self-regulation, whereby reductions in altruistic decisions after 
engaging in effortful self-regulation would indicate that self-regulation is indeed 
required. This has already been successfully done in adults whereby taxing self-
regulation led to a subsequent decrease sharing (Achtziger, Alos-Ferrer, & 
Wagner, 2015; Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Ockenfels, 2013).  
 
In two studies 124 children aged 6-9 years were tested to see if altruistic 
behavior would decrease as a function of prior engagement in two types of self-
regulation, namely behavioral control (Study 1) and emotion regulation (Study 
2). Altruistic behavior was measured through proposer behavior in the Dictator 
Game (DG) and responder behavior in the Ultimatum Game (UG). In the DG 
altruism is indicated by the extent to which children give up a valuable resource 
and share out of 6 monetary units (MUs) with an anonymous child (Beneson, 
Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gummerum, Hanoch, 
Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010). In the UG altruism is indicated by whether 
children reject unfair offers (1 out of 6 MUs) from an anonymous child. Because 
the rejection of offers in the UG leads to neither party receiving anything such an 
action indicates a willingness to forego rewards in order to altruistically sanction 
other’s behavior (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Knoch et al., 2006).  Both the DG and the 
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UG have been used extensively in children of this age range (Beneson et al., 2007; 
Harbaugh, Liday, & Krause, 2003; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012). 
 
To test specific hypotheses about the nature of the self-regulatory process 
required for altruistic decisions two types of self-regulation strategies were 
chosen, namely behavioral control (Study 1) and emotion regulation (Study 2). 
Behavioral control has been linked to both behavior in the DG (Blake et al., 2015) 
as well as responder behavior in the UG (Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, Tabibnia, & 
Robbins, 2010). It was therefore expected that taxing behavioral control in the 
first study would lead to a subsequent decrease in altruism as indicated by lower 
offers in the DG and fewer rejections of unfair offers in the UG.  To test for the 
potential specificity of a behavioral control mechanisms in altruistic behavior in 
a second study self-regulation was taxed by asking children to regulate their 
emotions or not. Emotion regulation is one of the most frequently used tasks to 
tax aspects of self-regulation and has been shown to work effectively, at least in 
adults (Hagger et al., 2010). Further, both behavioral control and emotion 
regulation have been shown to draw on the same neural circuitry (Berkman, 
Burklund, & Lieberman, 2009). A potential effect in the DG and the UG following 
emotion regulation would speak for a more general role of self-regulation in 
bringing about altruism in development, as opposed to a specific effect of 
behavioral control. 
 
In a first study 62 children were divided into two groups. In one group 
behavioral control was taxed by means of a task requiring inhibition of motor 
responses, whereas the other group performed the same task but without taxing 
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behavioral control. Subsequently both groups played a DG and a UG, which were 
counterbalanced across participants. To control for potential differences on 
fairness understanding and emotional experience children also rated the fairness 
of the four resource distributions possible with 6 MUs as well as their emotional 
experience after seeing the unfair offer in the UG. In a second study 62 children 
were also divided into two groups however instead of taxing inhibitory control 
one half of the children was asked to regulate their responses to emotional 
images while the other half could respond as they wished. Like in Study 1, 
children then played a DG and a UG and gave fairness ratings and indications of 
their emotional experience.  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants: 62 participants aged 6-9 year olds were tested (mean = 7.6 years  
1.107, range = 6.0 – 9.39 years, 32 females). Half the children (N = 31; 16 female) 
were assigned to a condition in which they had to react as fast as they could to a 
visual stimulus (a blue square). The other half was assigned to a condition, which 
taxed their behavioral control. This was achieved by asking them to inhibit 
responding to the first visual stimulus when this was followed by a second visual 
stimulus (green triangle). Children were recruited from schools in the area. The 
study was approved by the local Ethics Committee (E029-11-24012011) and 
written parental consent was provided for all subjects. Sample size was 
determined using the average sample size for studies using comparable designs 
as reported in a recent meta-analysis (Hagger et al, 2010). This was further 
increased by an additional 10% due to anticipated data loss and attrition as is 
common in developmental studies. Data collection stopped as soon as this 
sample size was reached.  Children were recruited from a database of parents in 
a middle-sized town, who had volunteered their children to participate in child 
development studies. Although no specific demographic data were collected, 
participants came from mostly middle-class backgrounds, and approximately 
98% of the population from which the sample was drawn was native German.  
 
Reaction Time Task: To manipulate whether children’s behavioral control was 
taxed or not a Stop-signal-reaction-time task was administered (SSRT; Logan, 
Schachar, & Tannock, 1997). Children were seated in front of a computer and 
were presented with 120 trials of blue squares (ITI approximately 4000 
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milliseconds). On 30 of those trials the blue square was shortly followed by a 
green triangle. Half of the children were asked to press the space bar as soon as a 
blue square appeared in the middle of the screen irrespective of whether a green 
triangle was presented or not (“react” condition). The other half of the children 
were also asked to respond as fast as they could to the appearance of a blue 
square, but to inhibit the response if a green triangle appeared shortly after the 
blue square (“control” condition). Trials with a triangle began with a 150 ms 
delay between seeing the blue square and the green triangle. To ensure that 
inhibitory control was maximally taxed in the control group, the stop signal 
delay was increased or decreased by an increment of 50ms per trial depending 
on whether the response was successfully inhibited or not. The threshold was 
thus dynamic and ensured that behavioral control was maximally taxed for every 
individuals in this group.  
 
Economic Games: Prior to the tasks, children were shown a table stacked with 
rewards such as games and toys that would be of interest to their age group. The 
rewards were arranged from left to right by increasing attractiveness as 
determined through extensive previous piloting with this age range (Steinbeis et 
al., 2012; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2015; Steinbeis, Haushofer, Fehr, & 
Singer, 2014; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013). The children were told that they were 
going to play some games during which they could win poker chips (henceforth 
monetary units), which they could subsequently trade in for one of the rewards. 
Depending on how many chips they had, the larger the range of rewards was 
from which they could chose.  
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To test for children’s willingness to share and the extent of their costly 
punishment they played one round of the Dicator Game (DG) in the role of the 
proposer and one round of the Ultimatum Game (UG) in the role of the responder 
respectively. Every child played both games and the order of games was 
counterbalanced across children.  
 
In the DG children were given 6 monetary units (MUs) and shown two round 
boxes marked with differing colors, one of which belonged to the participant and 
the other to another child that was anonymous. Children were told they could 
divide the poker chips whichever way they wanted between the two boxes.  
 
In the UG children were shown a third and again differently colored box and told 
that whatever was inside was the offer from another anonymous child, which 
had initially received 6 MUs. This offer was always 1 MU, which would be 
considered unfair by most (Steinbeis et al., 2012). Children were informed that 
they could say either “Yes” (accept) or “No” (reject) to the offer. In case of a “Yes“ 
everything would be shared as offered how the proposer had initiated it. In case 
of a “No“ however no one would obtain anything.  
 
For both games it was insured that all children had fully understood the 
instructions. This was checked by means of control questions pertaining to the 
number of MUs children were endowed with, who they thought they were 
playing with, which of the two boxes was for whom and in the case of the UG 
what would happen in the case of acceptance and rejection. If children 
responded incorrectly on any of the questions the instructions were reiterated 
Behavioral control and altruism in childhood 
 
 13 
up to two times. As a result all children were graded on their understanding of 
the task with deductions for having had to reiterate the instructions. All children 
understood the instructions and nature of the game at least after one repetition.   
 
To ensure that not too much time would be taken up through the instruction of 
the games and wash out any effect of the previous manipulation on behavior, 
participants were first instructed on the economic games, then performed the 
SSRT either with or without inhibition and then played the games immediately 
after.  
 
Fairness ratings: 
After having played the DG and the UG, children were asked to indicate whether 
the four different ways in which 6 MUs could be shared (6:0; 5:1; 4:2, 3:3) were 
fair or not. To do so they were given a sheet with the four distributions depicted 
and asked to tick a Yes box or a No box if they considered the distribution fair or 
not. Note that there was no indication that these were the result of decisions 
with a proposer or a responder; children were merely shown four distributions 
and asked to rate whether they thought the distributions were fair or not.  
 
Emotion ratings: 
After having played the DG and the UG, children were asked to rate how they felt 
when seeing the offer in the UG. They were presented with three scales denoting 
happiness, sadness and anger. Each scale was marked with a representative 
drawing of a face depicting the relevant emotion. Each scale was flanked by a 
large and a small version of the depicted image, in each case indicating how weak 
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or strong the specific emotion was felt. Children could indicate on a line going 
between the small and the large face how they felt. Fairness and emotion ratings 
were counterbalanced across participants. 
 
Correction for multiple testing is achieved by using a False Discovery Rate 
approach (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). This method controls for the 
expected proportion of rejected null hypotheses that were incorrectly rejected.  
 
Results:   
Reaction times (RTs) in response to targets were taken as a proxy for whether 
children had attempted to inhibit their motor impulses. These should be 
significantly increased in the group that has to inhibit responses to stop signals 
compared to the group only responding to the target. This was confirmed in that 
RTs were significantly greater for the behavioral control (RT = 557 ms) group 
than the reaction time group (RT = 379 ms; t(60) = 7.715; p < 0.001; d = 1.97).   
 
Comparison of the two groups’ sharing in the DG shows that children whose 
behavioral control had been previously taxed shared fewer MUs (1.25 MUs) than 
those whose behavioral control had not been taxed (1.9 MUs). Using a One-way 
ANOVA with condition as between-subject Factor, this difference was significant 
(F (1,60) = 4.468; p = 0.039; d = 0.56; Fig. 1A).  This effect remained significant 
after controlling for the factors gender, age and order of games played (F (1,57) = 
4.304; p = 0.043). Further, there were differences in the acceptance of unfair 
offers in that children who had to inhibit previously now accepted unfair offers 
more often (77%) than children who merely reacted previously (48%; 2 = 
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5.599; p = 0.017; Fig. 1B). Interestingly, while both sharing and costly 
punishment was affected by taxing children’s behavioral control, fairness ratings 
of offers of varying sizes were left unchanged (all 2 < 1.5; p > 0.3; Fig. 1C). Also, 
when asked retrospectively to evaluate their emotional experience in response 
to seeing unfair offers in the UG, there were no differences in terms of 
experienced happiness, sadness or anger as assessed by means of One-way 
ANOVAs (F-values < 1.4; p > 0.24; Fig. 1D).  There was a only a main effect of age 
on happiness ratings in that older children reported feeling less happy than 
younger children when seeing unfair offers (F(1,57) = 11.05; p = 0.002).  
All findings remain significant after controlling for multiple hypotheses using 
FDR.  
 
------- Figure 1 around here ------- 
 
These findings suggest that taxing behavioral control leads to a significant 
decrease in altruistic behavior, both in terms of sharing as well as costly 
punishment. But are these effects specific to taxing behavioral control or self-
regulation more generally? To address this question a second study was 
conducted using emotion regulation as a means to tax children’s self-regulation. 
If the effects observed in Study 1 are more generally related to self-regulation 
and not behavioral control similar effects should be observed in Study 2.  
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Experiment 2 
Method: 
Participants: 62 participants aged 6-9 year olds were tested (mean = 7.6 y, 
range = 5.8 – 9.6 y, 28 females). Half the children (N = 31; 16 female) were 
assigned to a condition in which they had to react to the emotional images. The 
other half was assigned to a condition, in which children had to regulate their 
emotions. Children were recruited from a database of parents in a middle-sized 
town, who had volunteered their children to participate in child development 
studies. Although no specific demographic data were collected, participants came 
from mostly middle-class backgrounds, and approximately 98% of the 
population from which the sample was drawn is native German. . This study was 
approved by the local Ethics committee (E029-11-24012011) and written 
parental consent was provided for all subjects. 
 
Emotion Regulation Task: To manipulate whether children’s emotion 
regulation was taxed or not an emotion regulation task was administered. 
Children were seated in front of a computer and were presented with 20 images 
depicting social scenes involving humans, ten of which were either pleasant and 
the other ten of which were unpleasant. Images were presented for 5000 
milliseconds. After each image children had 5000 milliseconds to indicate on a 
visual analog scale of 1 to 10 how they felt in response to what was depicted. 
Half of the children were asked to just indicate exactly how they felt (“react” 
condition). The other half of the children were asked to regulate their emotions 
by imagining that what was depicted was not real and never happened 
(“regulate” condition).  
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All other aspects of the experimental procedure were the same as in Study 1.  
 
Results: 
Ratings of emotional experience in response to positive and negative images 
were taken as measure for whether emotion regulation had taken place or not. 
These should be significantly reduced in children who have to regulate 
compared to those who only have to react. Comparison of ratings showed that 
the regulation group rated images as less emotional (rating = 2.9) than the 
reactivity group (rating = 4.0; t = -2.69; p = 0.009; d = 0.68).  
 
Comparing the two groups in terms of their decisions showed that there were no 
differences in either sharing (1.9 for the regulation and 1.7 for the reactivity 
group). Using a One-way ANOVA with condition as between-subject Factor, this 
difference was statistically not significant (F(1,60) = 0.321; p = 0.573; d = 0.14; 
Fig. 2A). Similarly, there was no significant difference between the two groups in 
terms of acceptance of unfair offers (both groups 51%; 2 = 0.068; p = 0.805; Fig. 
2B). A model including the factors gender, age, order of games played, as well as 
the factor condition yielded neither main effect of condition on sharing nor any 
interactions with any other factors (all p-values > 0.27). Additionally, fairness 
ratings were comparable for both groups (all 2 < 2.3; p > 0.15; Fig. 2C). 
Interestingly however, the emotion ratings in response to unfair offers revealed 
that the group of children which had previously had to regulate their emotions 
showed greater anger in response to unfair offers than the group which merely 
reacted to the stimuli as assessed by means of a One-way ANOVA (F(1,61) = 
Behavioral control and altruism in childhood 
 
 18 
8.630; p = 0.005; d = 0.68; Fig. 2D), while happiness and sadness were left 
unchanged (F-values < 0.8; p-values > 0.37). The effect of condition on 
experienced anger remained significant after controlling for gender, age and 
order of games played (F(1,57) = 9.217; p = 0.004). These findings indicate that 
even though emotion regulation clearly worked in terms of taxing the ability to 
regulate emotions, altruistic behavior was not affected.   
 
In a final step decisions between the two groups whose self-regulation had been 
taxed in Experiments 1 and 2 were compared. If behavioral control has a unique 
role in bringing about altruistic decisions then we should see a significant 
difference between the behavioral control and the emotion regulation group.  
Comparing the two groups using a One-way ANOVA showed larger offers in the 
DG for the emotion regulation group compared to the behavioral control group 
(F(1,59) = 4.279; p = 0.043; Cohen’s d = 0.53). There was also a greater 
willingness to accept poor offers in the UG, albeit marginally significant (2 = 
3.918; p = 0.062). The direct comparison of emotion ratings using a One-way 
ANOVA showed a significant difference only for anger whereby the emotion 
regulation group felt significantly angrier than the behavioral control group 
(F(1,59) = 4.27; p = 0.043; Cohen’s d = 0.45).  All findings remain significant after 
controlling for multiple hypotheses using FDR.  
 
 
 
------- Figure 2 around here ------- 
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Discussion: 
The results show that behavioral control plays a critical role in bringing about 
altruistic behavior in 6-9 year-olds. Children whose behavioral control had been 
taxed were less willing to share and more willing to accept unfair offers 
compared to children in a control condition. Interestingly, taxing behavioral 
control did not change the perception of fairness norms or retrospective 
evaluations of emotional experiences during the decision period. Findings from 
Study 2 show that emotion regulation had no significant effect on altruistic 
behavior but instead impacted the emotional experience in response to unfair 
offers. Together with the significant difference between the two groups 
previously taxed in behavioral control and emotion regulation in both sharing 
and costly punishment this suggests that the effects of Study 1 are specific to the 
necessity of behavioral control and not self-regulation per se in bringing about 
altruistic decisions in children.  
 
Studies on altruistic behavior have reported a discrepancy between children’s 
knowledge of fairness norms and how they adhere to them when making their 
decisions to share (Smith et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2012). Thus children know 
what a fair split is but do not act on that knowledge (Blake, McAuliffe, & 
Warneken, 2014). These findings suggest that behavioral control or lack thereof 
significantly influences the extent of this gap, whereby a lack of behavioral 
control will lead to its widening. The fact that altruistic behavior and not fairness 
judgments were changed suggests that the mechanistic role of behavioral control 
in altruistic behavior in children lies at the level of successfully acting in 
accordance with held fairness norms. Thus behavioral control in children is 
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relevant to actually behave altruistically as opposed to saying one thing and 
doing another.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that sharing and costly punishment during 
middle childhood require behavioral control. This simultaneously implies that 
during this developmental period altruistic decisions are not automatic and 
effortless. A string of findings that social behavior and in particular altruistic 
decisions become increasingly subject to contextual variables, such as moral 
status of the recipient (Vaish et al., 2010), group membership (Dunham et al., 
2011) and influencing one’s reputation (Engelmann et al., 2012; Leimgruber et 
al., 2012), implies the necessity of a behavioral control.  Such a mechanism 
allows titrating behavior according to the specific demands of the situation, 
avoiding the costs of indiscriminate altruism. The present findings however also 
highlight that behavioral control is required for altruism in its purest form by 
children of this age (i.e. to an anonymous other). One important related issue is 
the nature of boundary conditions of such a mechanism. Resource allocation can 
occur in a variety of settings (i.e. windfall vs. earned rewards; Hamann, 
Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011; collaborative as opposed to 
competitive settings; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). Presumably 
behavioral control might be required less when rewards are allocated according 
to merit or following collaboration. Further, given findings that different 
instances of altruistic behavior (i.e. sharing, helping and comforting) are not 
correlated in development (Dunfield et al., 2011), the present evidence can only 
be taken in support of behavioral control playing an important role in sharing. 
Future studies should test the extent to which behavioral control is a mechanism 
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that extends to other types of altruism. This study highlights the necessity of 
charting the underlying mechanisms of altruism throughout development before 
making claims about the similarities of mechanisms of children and adults (Rand 
et al., 2012; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). 
 
The joint findings of Study 1 and Study 2 suggest a mechanistic role of behavioral 
control specifically and not self-regulation per se in bringing about altruistic 
decisions in children aged 6 to 9 years. The emotion regulation task of Study 2 
also constitutes a fair control for more general alternative explanations such as 
fatigue effects, differences in perceived effort or participants’ desire to reward 
themselves, often made to account for the generally observed effects of self-
regulation tasks leading to a performance drop on subsequent self-regulation 
tasks (Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). While the present set of studies did 
not obtain subjective reports of fatigue, effort or desire for a reward, two pieces 
of evidence speak against these alternative accounts.  First, the differences in 
emotion ratings between the two groups in the second study demonstrate that 
the task clearly taxed aspects of self-regulation for the group that had to 
explicitly regulate their emotions. Second, the fact that emotion regulation prior 
to the decision-making period significantly increased subsequent ratings of 
anger when seeing unfair offers in the UG demonstrates that emotion regulation 
was in fact taxed sufficiently to lead to changes in subsequent affective 
experience. However instead of influencing behavior it altered only emotional 
responses. These findings are important for several reasons. First, they suggest 
that contrary to the idea that ego-depletion is a general effect Hagger et al., 
2010), specific ways of taxing self-regulation can have specific effects on 
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subsequent outcome measures. Second, the finding that feelings of anger in 
response to unfair offers increased subsequent to the emotion regulation 
condition is interesting given that this did not apparently influence the behavior 
in the UG. Studies in adults suggest that the experience of anger drives rejection 
rates of unfair offers (Crockett et al., 2010; van 't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 
2006). The present findings imply instead that even though anger is increased in 
children whose emotion regulation had been previously taxed, this has no effect 
on rejections in the UG. Third, the fact that behavioral control influenced both 
altruistic behavior in the DG and the UG suggests a common mechanistic basis 
for these decisions in childhood. Whereas in adults it has been shown that these 
decisions are not correlated Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014), these findings 
indicate that this undergoes further differentiation with development.  
 
Whether rejections of unfair distributions truly reflect altruistic tendencies has 
been debated. Thus some have argued that rejections may be driven by motives 
such as spite rather than altruistic tendencies (McAuliffe, Blake, & Warneken, 
2014). The experience of spite has been shown to have emotional antecedents 
(Steinbeis & Singer, 2013), where the tendency to feel negative emotions was 
shown to predict spiteful behavior. Interestingly, the data collected in the 
present study on emotional experience in response to unfair offers is informative 
on this issue. Thus, the data from Study 1 indicate that there is no increased 
anger in the group of children who reject unfair offers more, while Study 2 
indicates that there is no increase in rejections of unfair offers in the group of 
children who report greater anger, a finding already observed previously 
(Steinbeis et al., 2012). While the present study did not obtain direct measures of 
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spite, the absence of a relationship between its most likely emotional antecedent, 
namely anger, and rejection of unfair offers, does not lend too much support to 
the notion that spite drives such rejections. The potential discrepancy in findings 
can be explained by differences in experimental set-up. Thus, whereas in the 
present study the unequal distribution was offered by the other player, in 
McAuliffe et al., (2014) this was imposed by the experimenter. This small 
difference in set-up however undermines the necessity to punish any behavior 
seeing that there is nothing to punish, thus presumably changing the underlying 
mechanism that drives children’s rejection behavior.  Future studies should 
focus on testing the extent to which such decision patterns hold under varying 
contexts and circumstances 
 
These findings have to be discussed with reference to current theories of ego-
depletion. Most prominently it has been argued that effects of prior exertion on 
subsequent tasks occur as a function of a depletion of resources (Hagger et al., 
2010). This would imply that reduced altruistic decisions occur because of a 
reduction in behavioral control resources. Such a view has been criticized of late 
(Carter, Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 2015). Instead it has been argued that 
opportunity costs associated with executive functions such as behavioral control 
are subjected to cost-benefit analyses, which in turn are experienced as effortful 
(Kurzban et al., 2013). Accordingly it has been shown that the experience of 
effort resulting from an effortful first task that motivates reduced deployment of 
executive functions on a subsequent task (Kool, McGuire, Wang, & Botvinick, 
2013; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). This would suggest that the presently 
observed reduction in altruistic behavior following a behavioral control task 
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occurs from an increased motivation to avoid effortful tasks, implying that 
sharing and costly punishment are experienced as effortful. Future research will 
have to determine how children experience behavioral control, sharing and 
costly punishment to unequivocally establish the role of subjectively experienced 
effort. One further caveat remains how widely such a mechanism would apply to 
real-life decisions. While there is good evidence that prosocial decisions taken in 
the lab are predictive of prosocial decisions also in real-life contexts in adults 
(Benz & Maier, 2008), if this is also the case for children remains to be seen and 
is an excellent avenue for future research. 
 
The present study provides evidence for a mechanistic role of behavioral control 
in bringing about altruistic decisions in 6-9 year olds. Children were less willing 
to share and more willing to accept unfair offers after their behavioral control 
had been taxed. These findings suggest that children’s altruistic acts are effortful. 
Importantly, these studies speak to a privileged role of behavioral control 
specifically in bringing about altruistic behavior in children and in bridging the 
commonly observed knowledge-behavior gap children display in the context of 
resource allocation paradigms. These results also have broad implications for 
designing interventions designed to promote prosocial behavior early in 
childhood. Thus, rather than focusing on an awareness of fairness norms, which 
are present already early in development, the findings indicate that targeting the 
level of knowledge implementation, through increased behavioral control would 
be the most fruitful approach. Future studies will have to see if behavioral 
control trainings can lead to an inverse and beneficial effect compared to the 
detrimental effect reported here.  
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Fig. 1. Effects of taxing behavioral control on altruistic behavior in 62 children. 
Children whose behavioral control had been taxed showed (A) decreased 
sharing and (B) a greater willingness to accept unfair offers compared to a group 
of children who did not engage in behavioral control previously. Both groups 
showed comparable (C) fairness judgments and (D) emotion ratings in response 
to unfair offers in the UG. 
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Fig. 2. Effects of taxing emotion regulation on altruistic behavior in 62 children. 
Children whose emotion regulation had been taxed showed (A) comparable 
sharing and (B) a comparable willingness to accept unfair offers compared to a 
group of children who did not engage in emotion regulation previously. While 
both groups showed comparable (C) fairness judgments children who had had to 
regulate their emotions previously (D) showed greater anger in response to 
unfair offers in the UG. 
 
 
